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in Dumping Cases
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The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reversed a decision
of the Court of International Trade and upheld a Department of Commerce
dumping regulation favored by U.S. producers and opposed by foreign
producers and exporters. This note describes these court decisions and
explains their significance regarding: (1) the fairness of price comparisons
in Commerce's determination whether sales are less than "fair value"
(LTFV); and (2) Commerce's discretion in administering the dumping law.
I. Commerce's Regulation Establishing
the ESP Offset Cap
In an investigation under the antidumping (AD) law,1 the Department of
Commerce (Commerce) 2 determines whether imports have been sold at less
than their "fair value" 3 by comparing the United States price with the
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**Deputy General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative. Formerly O'Melveny &
Myers, Washington, D.C.; Deputy (for Policy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Import Administration.
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1. §§ 731-778 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended [hereinafter cited as the Act], 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1673-1677g (1982).
2. Commerce is the "administering authority" under the AD law. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979,
§ 2(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273, 69,274 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1170 (1982); Exec.
Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. §§ 131, 135 (1983). The International Trade Commission (ITC)
determines whether LTFV imports cause or threaten material injury to a U.S. industry, or
materially retard the establishment of such an industry. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(a), 1673d(b)
(1982). If Commerce finds LTFV sales and the ITC finds injury, then importers must deposit in
cash estimated antidumping duties until antidumping duties are subsequently assessed and
entries liquidated. The Act, supra note 1, at § 736, 19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1982).
3. The Act uses but does not define the term "fair value." The Act, supra note 1, at §§ 731,
733, 735, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673b, 1673d (1982).
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foreign market value.4 Commerce determines foreign market value using,
in order of general preference, the prices at which such or similar merchan-
dise is sold in the home market or in third country markets, or a constructed
value of the merchandise based on the cost of materials and fabrication,
general expenses and profit.5 Commerce determines United States price
using purchase price when the foreign exporter sells to an unrelated party in
the U.S., and exporter's sales price (ESP) when the exporter sells to a
related party. The ESP is the price charged to the first unrelated buyer in the
U.S. 6 As the Court of Appeals explained in Smith-Corona Group, Con-
sumer Products Div., SCM Corp. v. United States (hereinafter cited as
SCM),7 the AD law "attempts to construct value on the basis of arm's length
transactions." ESP is used rather than purchase price where the exporter
and importer are related and thus do not set prices at arm's length.
The statute subjects foreign market value, however derived, to adjust-
ment for certain differences in quantities, physical characteristics, and other
circumstances of sale.8 By regulation, the adjustment for differences in
circumstances of sale is "limited, in general, to those circumstances which
bear a direct relationship to the sales which are under consideration" (em-
phasis added). 9 It also provides adjustment for certain specified "direct
costs" to United States prices, whether based on purchase price or ESP.
However, under the statute ESP is uniquely adjusted downward by the
amount of certain "indirect costs"; that is, "expenses generally incurred by
or for the account of the exporter in the United States in selling identical or
substantially identical merchandise." 10 By lowering ESP, this adjustment
increases dumping margins (i.e., the amount by which foreign market value
exceeds United States price).
The Department of the Treasury, which made LTFV determinations until
1980, perceived that this increase in margins was unfair.11 In 1976, it
changed its regulation on circumstances of sale "to reflect long existing
Treasury practice" to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, this
unfairness. 12 When Commerce became the administering authority charged
4. The Act, supra note 1, at §§ 772, 773, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677a, 1677b (1982).
5. The Act, supra note 1, at §§ 773(a)(1)(A), (B), (a)(2), (e), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(a)(1)(A),
(B), (a)(2), (e) (1982).
6. The Act, supra note 1, at § 772, 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (1982).
7. 713 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1274 (1984).
8. The Act, supra note 1, at § 773(a)(4), 19 U.S.C. § 1677(a)(4) (1982). Commerce's AD
regulations add a fourth adjustment for differences in level of trade. 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 (1984).
9. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(a) (1984).
10. The Act, supra note 1, at § 772(e)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e) (1982).
11. 713 F.2d at 1577-79.
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,203, 26,206 (1976), codified at 19 C.F.R. § 153.10(b) (1976). The
amended regulation provided: "In making comparisons using exporter's sales price, reasonable
allowance will be made for actual selling expenses incurred in the home market up to the
amount of the selling expenses incurred in the United States market."
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with making LTFV determinations in 1980, it published its own AD regula-
tions, including this one, without significant change. 13 Pursuant to the "ESP
offset," foreign market value is reduced for indirect selling expenses incur-
red in the home market. However, this offset is limited or capped-and
therefore referred to as the "ESP offset cap"-by the amount of all selling
expenses in the U.S. market for which a circumstance of sale adjustment is
allowed. 14 By specially reducing foreign market value in ESP situations, the
ESP offset decreases dumping margins and is supported by foreign produc-
ers and exporters and opposed by U.S. producers. By limiting this reduc-
tion, the ESP offset cap maintains higher margins and therefore is opposed
by foreign producers and exporters and supported by U.S. producers.
II. The SCM Case: A U.S. Producer
Challenges the ESP Offset
In the SCM case, "the last remaining domestic manufacturer of portable
electric typewriters"' 5 appealed a Commerce AD order covering such prod-
ucts from Japan1 6 (and a Court of International Trade order sustaining that
decision 17). SCM (Smith-Corona) challenged Commerce's regulation pro-
viding for the ESP offset. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
upheld the validity of the regulation. As the court explained:
One of the goals of the statute is to guarantee that the administering authority
makes the fair value comparison on a fair basis-comparing apples with apples.
The offset appears to generate two fair value comparisons, apples with apples
(purchase price) and oranges with oranges (exporter's sales price).... Were it not
for the exporter's sales price offset, comparisons based on purchase price would be
fair, yet comparisons based on exporter's sales price would be skewed in favor of a
higher dumping margin. We do not believe that the statute requires the Secretary
to compare both apples and oranges with only apples. Rather, it expressly requires
a fair comparison. The offset is an attempt to achieve such a comparison.8
Accordingly the court held:
If the statute is skewed by the offset it is because the Secretary, in constructing a
fair comparison, has erected the offset on a foundation that was already slightly
askew. In view of the discretion accorded the Secretary under the statute to make
adjustments to foreign market value, we conclude that the exporter's sales price
offset, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c), is a proper and reasonable exercise of the Secre-
13. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1980).
14. 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1984).
15. 713 F.2d at 1570.
16. Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 53,853 (1980) (final), a review
under § 736(c) of the Act (19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1982)) of its earlier AD order, Portable Electric
Typewriters from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 30,618 (1980) (order).
17. Brother Indus. U.S., Ltd. v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 1341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982)
(Newman, J.).
18. 713 F.2d at 1578.
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tary's authority to administer the statute fairly. Thus, insofar as it is challenged
here, 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c), is valid.19
III. The Silver Reed Cases: Foreign Producers/Exporters
and U.S. Importers Challenge the ESP Offset Cap
The broad "apples with apples ... and oranges with oranges" language of
the court in SCM 20 apparently inspired a foreign producer and its related
U.S. importer in the same initial Commerce AD investigation of portable
electric typewriters from Japan to challenge the same regulation, 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.15(c). Whereas SCM had complained unsuccessfully about the ESP
offset, a Japanese producer and its related U.S. importer later complained
about the cap to that offset.
Applying the logic of Brother Industries and SCM, in Silver Reed Amer-
ica, Inc. v. United States (hereinafter cited as Silver Reed 1), 21 the Court of
International Trade (again Judge Newman) concluded that the ESP offset
cap was invalid because it contravenes the law's scheme for an efficient and
fair comparison between foreign market value and United States price. The
court held that since all indirect expenses are subtracted from ESP, all
indirect expenses should be subtracted from foreign market value to recon-
struct prices at a specific "common" point. Judge Newman supported his
decision with SCM and his own opinion in Brother Industries.2 Both those
cases supported the ESP offset regulation because it eliminated an unfair
comparison. Since in Judge Newman's opinion the cap "thwarts" a fair
comparison, he held it to be contrary to the statutory purpose of facilitating
fair comparisons. Therefore, he ruled that Commerce lacked discretion to
promulgate such a regulation.
As underscored above, unfairness is eliminated only "in part" by the capped
ESP offset. Obviously, the application of the cap thwarts a fair comparison of
"apples with apples" to the extent that fixed selling expenses must be deducted
from the United States price... but deduction of similar selling expenses in the
home market is arbitrarily limited. Inasmuch as Congress stipulated the deduction
of all selling expenses from the United States price, undoubtedly the intent was
19. Id at 1579. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 81-06-00734 (Ct. Int'l Trade, Mar.
13, 1985) (Watson, J.), the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the ESP offset is invalid-an
issue that plaintiff had acknowledged was decided in the SCM case. Yet in five full pages of
dicta, the court disparaged the Court of Appeal's reasoning in SCM upholding the ESP offset.
The Zenith court characterized the offset as "a thwarting of Congressional intention" (at 19)
and a "nullification of the step specifically provided by law" (id.) that "does violence to this
carefully worked-out statutory method" (id. at 20). In summary, the court decried SCM's
giving Commerce "discretion to promulgate rules which alter this statutory method of valua-
tion..." (id. at 22). Yet "with these comments in mind" (id.), it conformed to the SCM ruling
and rejected plaintiff's challenge to the ESP offset.
20. 713 F.2d at 1578.
21. 581 F. Supp. 1290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
22. See supra note 17.
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that the same treatment be accorded foreign market value to achieve the objective
of a fair comparison of "apples with apples." In view of that clear statutory
objective, the administering authority acted arbitrarily and beyond its authority in
capping the offset as prescribed by 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c).
21
Intervenor SCM requested that the issue be certified for immediate
appeal, and the United States government supported this motion. The
government supported SCM's appeal and defended its regulation. z4 The
government feared that Judge Newman's decision would lead to unjusti-
fiable (in its view) differentiation of purchase price and ESP comparisons:
with respect to the former, Commerce would adjust only for directly related
expenses; whereas with respect to the latter, it would adjust for all selling
expenses, direct and indirect, if the cap were not applied.
In Consumer Products, Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc.
(hereinafter cited as SCM II), the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of
International Trade, and upheld the ESP offset cap. 25 The Court of Appeals
did not analyze whether the ESP offset cap facilitates or thwarts a fair
"apples with apples" comparison of prices. Instead, it framed its inquiry in
terms of the reasonableness of Commerce's regulation establishing the cap.
The court reasoned that: "In determining whether a regulation is reason-
able, we must give considerable deference to the expertise of the agency,
i.e., the 'masters of the subject."' 26 The court added that Commerce's
interpretation of the statute "need not be the only reasonable interpretation
or the one which the court views as the most reasonable." 27 In conclusion,
the court found
no arbitrariness in limiting the adjustment for indirect selling expenses allowed
against the Japanese market prices to the amount of such expenses in the United
States. The decision to do no more than nullify the amount by which the price
comparison would have been skewed in favor of a higher dumping margin is not
irrational. Indeed, any greater allowance could distort the computations in favor
of foreign manufacturers.
28
Moreover, the court seemed to place significant weight on Commerce's
administrative convenience. The government had argued that the ESP
offset is valid and has been upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit based upon the broad discretion granted the Secretary of Commerce
in administering the antidumping law. 2 9 The court agreed that "the cap does
23. Silver Reed 1, 581 F. Supp. at 1295.
24. Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, No. 83-10-01522 (Ct. Int'l Trade, Jan. 4,
1985).
25. 753 F.2d at 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 1039.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1040.
29. Id.
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aid in efficient administration and assist the agency in meeting the exigencies
of time and staff limitations." 30 The court continued:
The ESP offset cap undoubtedly furthers this valid goal. In accordance with the
ESP offset cap, Commerce need only be convinced that valid expenses meet or
exceed the level of the cap. In a very practical sense, the extent of scrutiny is
reduced. The result is a more efficient and expedited administrative process.
31
IV. Significance of ESP Offset and
ESP Offset Cap Litigation
As a result of the related SCM and Silver Reed litigation, Commerce of
course continues to apply both the ESP offset and its cap. More broadly, the
sweeping "apples with apples" fairness language in SCM will be seen by
some as having been somewhat restricted by the court. In applying the AD
law, Commerce need not take what either a party or the Court might
consider to be the fairest action, so long as the action it takes is a reasonable
application of the AD law, its regulations and its discretion. Effectively, the
Court of Appeals has recognized that applying the AD law is more an art
than a science, and that mathematical precision is neither expected nor
required.
The other significance is the court's deference to Commerce's administra-
tive convenience. This rationale upholds Commerce's position that in AD
and countervailing duty (CVD) cases, which are increasing in number and
complexity and governed by stringent statutory deadlines, its administrative
convenience is a reasonable basis for choosing one possible method over
another. SCM II will therefore prove a powerful precedent for the govern-
ment in future challenges to Commerce's AD and CVD determinations.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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